SALACHOVÁ BOHUMILA, VÍTEK BOHUMIL: Interpretation of European law, selected issues. Acta Universitatis Agriculturae et Silviculturae Mendelianae Brunensis, 2013, LXI, No. 7, pp. 2717-2720 The article deals with the issue of interpretation of European law. It is based on the classical methodology of law interpretation in continental Europe, but it also refl ects the particularities and recent approaches, which are used in European law as in independent and particular legal system. So it is essential to emphasize the autonomous conception of European law, which fi nally means its own methodology which is diff erent from national attitudes.
Interpretation means a mental process during which a man, as a subject of interpretation, aff ects the reality by something which predicates of the situation (object of interpretation). 1 According to V. Knapp, in general, interpretation is giving meaning to the characters, i. e. appearing of meaning of the signs. Interpretation is an essential part of the legal regulation procedure. Its main role can be seen in correct practical application of law but it is impossible to apply the legal rule correctly without aff ecting its meaning.
The rudiments of classical methodology of legal interpretation were laid down by F. C. von Savigny in 19 th century. By the legal interpretation Savigny means the ideas included in statutes whilst this construction is allowed by application of four interpretative methods, including the grammatical, logical, historical and systematical method. According to Savigny, these methods do not stand independently and the interpreter is not allowed to use them arbitrarily but if the interpretation should be successful they shall operate in the interconnection. To the list of methods Savigny did not include the teleological method but the considers purposes to be the auxiliary means of fi nding the meaning (reasons) of statutes and of internal value of interpretation result, especially in connection with analysis of vague and unclear terms interpretation. 
1) Basics resources
European law interpretation 4 is governed by its own interpretation rules, which diff er both from national interpretation rules and International Public Law. By practice of European bodies and mainly by judgments of Court of Justice of European Union (herea er CJEU) was established specifi c set of rules (respectively of metarules) leading to specifi cation of European legal rules (interpretation and application), which corresponds to peculiarities of European Union as an integrative society. According to Tichý, European law interpretation (in a broader sense of word) consists of three specifi c performance while implementation of European Law:
The application itself (application in a strict sense of word) -includes eliminating of ambiguous and contrary provisions of European Law.
The development of law -represents supplementing of imperfect texts of the legal regulations, mainly of gaps existing in legislation. This procedure requires understanding of the sense of regulation and of legal order itself with the regard of objective of specifi c regulation. This required procedure is mainly reached by systematical and theological method of interpretation of aff ected regulation and also of its comprehensive legal context.
A judge-made law (a case law) -is used by the CJEU necessarily in cases which require this accession particularly. Legal rules creation is used as much as it is necessary for the European Union capacity for action. 
2) European law interpretative methods
In terms of sequence of interpretative methods stands fi rst grammatical method. In case of situation when the legal regulation is a er using of grammatical method clear and unambiguous, this interpretation shall not be excluded by other means of interpretation attained by diff erent methods. On the other hand other methods are suitable if the legal regulation is unclear and ambiguous and the grammatical interpretation fails. Never less exceptional could be situation when despite the unambiguous meaning it is necessary to use teleological interpretative method 6 (see following text).
The subject of interpretation is a legal rule text in all its language versions (case 55/87 Moksel). For the each language of 25 offi cially used language is equal, this is relatively complicated situation. Thus it is impossible to use majority principle, i.e. to incline to the interpretation to which leads the texts of majority of the offi cial versions. In this case it is necessary to use other interpretative methods and mainly to fi nd out the meaning and purpose of the specifi c legal regulation.
7 It is inadmissible, while interpreting legal concepts, to the base on national legislation, but it is necessary to interpret each legal concept autonomously as European law legal concepts. In this case it can be used auxiliary legal concept interpretative rule in dubio pro communitate, created by European law.
When the interpreted text remains unambiguous, despite using grammatical interpretation, it is necessary to focus on the relations of the legal regulation. In these cases the systematical interpretation is used. By the systematical method can be guaranteed internal compliance of provisions (case 101/63 Wagner). It consists in unitary interpretation of whole European law, the concepts of European law are interpreted in the same manner, and as a reason of autonomic interpretation they o en diff er from the substantive content of homonymous terms of national laws. This unifi cation, i.e. uniform interpretation, is mainly supported by institute of preliminary question.
8 During this proceeding (also called prejudicial or preliminary proceeding) the CJEU is applying the interpretation of Treaties (the primary legislation) and acts passed by the institutions or by other EU bodies (the secondary legislation). Under this procedure, the CJEU is also entitled to decide on the validity of the secondary legislative acts. This procedure institute is specifi c by the fact, that the decisions of the CJEU are not merits, but are only expressing the relevant question of law, raised by the national court resolving particular dispute. By this fact can be provided unifi ed application and homogenous interpretation of European law rules 4 European law is a peculiar system of law which comprises a primarily supranational European Union law, and the law of the European Union, which are still based on the principles of international cooperation between Member States of the European Union (including the common foreign and security policy as the earlier II. Pillar of EU law in the national territories of member states, while the relationship between the national courts applying European law and the CJEU is characterized by the principle of cooperation.
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A conformal interpretation of the primary law is a type of systematical interpretation. It functions as a defi nition or specifi cation of the secondary law, if more interpretations are acceptable, in the sense that the provision shall be compatible with the EU Treaties and with the general principles of European law(case C-314/89 Rauh). The interpretation which is complementary to the objectives of the primary legislation shall be preferred to the interpretation leading to a provision with contradictory meaning to the primary legislation (case 205/84 Commission v Germany). In this case the legal rule of higher legal force is, rather than the criterion, a tool to determine the standards of lower legal force.
However the decisive interpretation of European law has the teleological interpretation, focused on meaning and purpose of the European law rules. The existence and dynamical development of the nature of contracts, as a constantly developing framework of the integration process, is allowed by the teleological arguments. On the basis of the teleological arguments a breakthrough was achieved on certain decisions and as well as on the certain fundamental shi s in the understanding of the importance of European law.
The interpretative principle of eff ectiveness (eff et utile) is refl ective when interpreting the European law by using the teleological method of interpretation, which means not only taking into account the objective (to which leads the teleological method) but also the eff ort to reach the goal as eff ectively as possible (case C 292/89 Antonissen). 10 The character of the European law was signifi cantly infl uenced by the principle of eff et utile. It is expressed when interpreting (is one of the basic characteristics of the method of interpretation of European law) and it many other principles are based on the principle of eff et utille, mainly the principles concerning the European law application. On the basis of the eff et utile principle was inferred the principle of direct eff ect, indirect eff ect, the principle of primacy and the state liability of damage. However according to Bydlinski Another principle o en used in addition by the CJEU beside the eff et utile principle is a principle taken from the U.S. doctrine, known as the implied powers, 12 thus the principle of the unwritten or hidden powers. The CJEU came to the conclusion that without the use of this principle is o en not possible to reach a reasonable results (in this matter The Commission has jurisdiction, which can be inferred only from the content of certain provisions) (case 22/70 Commission v Council).
The systematic interpretation of the CJEU also frequently performs a legal comparison. Comparative interpretation applies in particular to the concepts of the general principles of law arising from national legal systems, which are being compared. The comparison is also a method used in the fi eld of competition law, where the CJEU o en turns to U.S. law. The concept of competition was for the fi rst time introduced already in the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community and its foundations remained virtually untouched to these days. But as Bejček says some approaches vary, mainly the ones which are aff ected by some tendencies used especially in the U.S. This tendency is generally known as "more economic approach".
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However, even when using comparative interpretation the autonomous concept of the European law should be re-emphasized, which in its own result means a diff erent methodology from national approaches.
Autonomous interpretation means that the terms contained in the legal norms of the European law are interpreted independently on the laws of the Member States, although there also exist.
It is possible that the CJEU may take into account the interpretation of national courts, but the CJEU cannot be bound by their interpretation (not even though when he gets inspired). Autonomous interpretation thus implies a fundamental rejection of analogy in relation to the national legal system. The appeal to the national legal system is possible only if the European law itself refers to the law of the Member State.
Finally, it is necessary to mention the method of compelling justifi cation. When applying the above mentioned principles, methods and approaches it is generally diffi cult to a fi rm conclusion, and therefore it is necessary to take into account a number of other interests and principles, even the competing ones. Especially in these situations, the decision-making body necessarily has to choose the most convincing option. The important role is o en played by the fact that in a similar case the CJEU has already clearly decided or has expressed its opinion on the preliminary question respectively. It is the CJEU, who seeks not only to ensure that his decision has a rational manner using interpretive rules justifi able, but to also show that no more justifi able decisions exist. 
SUMMARY
The European law, at least in terms of primary law, is the framework right. It contains a number of general and undefi ned concepts, as well as a number of generally formulated rules. It was necessary to establish a mechanism preventing diff erent interpretations of the concepts and rules with a regard to the application by national courts of the Member States. The power to stipulate authoritative and therefore binding (uniform) interpretation of the European law was, unlike as in the international contract law, where the interpretation of international treaties belongs to the parties, delegated on the CJEU. It can be said that the specifi c application of the interpretative methods in the case of European law is dealing with the status the CJEU as a co-legislator. However in some cases the CJEU goes beyond mere interpretation in the narrower sense (i.e. the identifi cation of the content and of the meaning of the standard) and formulates new rules reasoned by the interpreted rulings. The CJEU o en resorts in a question of ambiguity of the language interpretative method to the teleological method which is always based on the EU objectives and on the purpose of applied legislation. The new rules have sometimes the form of general principles, which are further enforced in other cases. We can then ask, at this point, whether it is still the interpretation or it is completion or even creation of law. Than the European law (taken with a bit of exaggeration) could hardly meet any expectations in the sense that "it is never what it was." The important think is that somewhere directed. Thus the European law is primarily what it is becoming on its own.
